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NUMBER 1

The Endangered Species Act
and Western Water Rights
A. Dan Tarlock*
The problems associated with the federal government enforcing the EndangeredSpecies Act while the western states attempt
to manage their water resourcespresent a classic example of the
conflict between federal environmentalpolicy and state resource
managementprograms. In this article, the author considers the
effect of the federal government's "regulatoryproperty rights"
under the Endangered Species Act and section 404 of the Clean
WaterAct on water management by the western states. The author
then proposes some ways in which to mitigate the conflict between
the western states' objectives in managing their water resources
and the federal government's objectives in enforcing the Endangered Species Act and section 404 of the Clean Water Act.
The United States has a strong endangered species policy that potentially conflicts with state water diversion and impoundment projects.'
Federal endangered species policy has evolved from preserving commercially valuable or well-known species to protecting habitats needed to maintain threatened animals, fish, insects and plants.2 Habitat destruction is
the major threat to endangered species and, while habitat preservation
may be the most effective remedy, it is also the most far-reaching to
preserve a species. As a result of the evolution of federal policy to preserve
*Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. This
article is a revision of a speech prepared for the University of Colorado School of Law Natural
Resources Law Center's Fifth Annual Summer Program entitled The FederalImpact on State
Water Rights, held in Boulder, Colorado, June 11-13, 1984.
1. ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY- 1980: THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL

ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 64-69 (1980). The evolution of species protection is described
in Miller, The Earth'sLiving TerrestrialResources: Managing Their Conservation, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION (D. Kay & H. Jacobson eds. 1983).
2. See generally Coggins and Russell, Beyond Shooting Snail Darters in Pork Barrels: Endangered Species and Land Use in America, 70 GEO. L.J. 1433 (1982). See also
Versteeg, The Protectionof Endangered Species:A CanadianPerspective, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q.
267 (1984).
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habitat in order to protect endangered species, the operation of many
planned and existing water projects must pass muster under the Endangered Species Act of 1973.1
The shift toward habitat preservation on a modest scale is significant
for water development activities. Water development activities are now
evaluated, in part, by backdoor federal water-related land use planning
processes under the environmental programs that Congress has superimposed on resource development programs. Compliance with the Endangered Species Act is controversial in the West for the reason that it
constrains the operation and location of water projects. Coupled with section 404 of the Clean Water Act', the two acts have the potential to limit
severely and to modify traditional state water development activities.
Efforts to weaken the Endangered Species Act have failed and are
likely to fail in the future in light of the increasing appreciation of the
role of biological diversity in the world's ecosystems.5 Thus, endangered
species protection must be added to the list of environmental constraintssuch as the Clean Water Act, in-stream flow protection, wetlands preservation, and environmental impact analysis-that affect western water
development.
Conflicts between federal environmental regulations and state water
development were exemplified during the hearings on the 1982 Amendments to the Endangered Species Act:
One result of the Act's inflexibility which is of real concern
to us, and should be of concern to all, is the de facto interstate
apportionment and intrastate appropriation of waters which the
FWS [Fish and Wildlife Service] is effectively accomplishing by
imposing substantial minimum flow releases on water storage projects. For example, in order to obtain a non-jeopardy opinion on
the Colorado River squawfish from FWS on its White River Dam,
the State of Utah recently had to agree to release a minimum of
250 second-feet (cfs) of water at the dam during most of the year,
with higher releases in the spawning period, and to augment the
minimum flow by up to 5000 acre-feet from inactive storage when
natural river flows fall below the 250 cfs minimum and as the matter stands now, our own sub-district's Taylor Draw reservoir, also
to be constructed on the White River above Utah's project, will
be forced to release up to 200 cfs, depending upon river flows. All
of this has the potential to interfere with appropriative rights
under State water laws as well as interstate apportionments under
the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact. 6
3. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982).
4. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982).
5. See infra text accompanying note 94.
6. EndangeredSpecies Act Amendments, 1982: Hearingon S. 2309 Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 235-36 (1982) (statement of Roland C. Fisher, Colorado River Water
Conservation District). Congressman Cheney of Wyoming has made an even stronger state-
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Regulatory programs such as the Endangered Species Act and section 404 of the Clean Water Act create "regulatory property rights." These
programs are not usually conceptualized as property rights assignments,
but any program that prevents the degradation of commons effectively
does this. Modern regulatory programs cancel the historic de facto assignment of property rights in commons to exploiters and reassign them to
the government as agent for the public generally. It is therefore important to characterize the results of regulatory programs as "regulatory
property rights" in order to appreciate the potential effect of such programs and to compare the costs and benefits of federal government intervention on a traditional area of private rights.7
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES

ACT

The protection of endangered species goes to the heart of environmentalism and raises difficult problems of justification.' Why should society
choose to protect endangered species at the expense of other social values?
Protecting endangered species by preventing human interference with
natural ecosystems exposes to scrutiny the utilitarian benefits of this
policy and the non-utilitarian arguments for species diversity.9
The Council of Environmental Quality warned in its 1980 report, "[ijf
the physiochemical (nonliving) and biological environments posed no uncertainties, evolution by natural selection might eventually stop as surviving species would come to consist entirely of "optimal' genotypes."10 However, biological change occurs regardless of human intervention. The preservation of biological and genetic diversity therefore cannot be justified
ment: "[T]he Endangered Species Act has gone beyond its original purpose and will stop
water projects in the West. It even runs the risk of redoing all of the interstate compacts
governing which state gets what share of available water supplies." WESTERN STATES WATER,
Issue No. 535 (August 17, 1984). See also EndangeredSpecies Oversigh4 1982: HearingBefore
the Subcomm. on EnvironmentalPollution of the Senate Comm. on Environmentand Public
Works, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 311 (1982) (statement of D. Craig Bell, Executive Director,
Western States Water Council). See generally J. BEHNKE, THE IMPACTS OF HABITAT ALTERNATIONS ON THE ENDANGERED AND THREATENED FISHES OF THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER AND
ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTHWEST: PROBLEMS OF WATER, FISH AND WILDLIFE IN
THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN 104 (1980).

7. See Barnes, Enforcing PropertyRights: Extending Property Rights Theory to Congestible and Environmental Goods, 10 ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 583 (1982).
8. J. PASSMORE, MAN'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATURE 101-26 (1974). Professor Edwin
Smith has summarized the three conventional justifications for species protection:
First, basic scientific research involving wild species provides new data on the
function of biological systems and forms the basis for new theories of human
origins and capacities. Second, biological diversity provides instrumental
benefits; through direct exploitation of wild species, valuable products may
be acquired which can fulfill important human needs, while the indirect benefits
of functioning ecosystems provide critical life support services. Finally, a num-

ber of ethical arguments support the case for biological conservation.
Smith, The EndangeredSpecies Act and Biological Conservation, 57 So. CAL. L. REV. 361,
370 (1984).
9. J. PASSMORE, supra note 8, at 17.
10. ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY - 1980, supra note 1, at 33. Most theories of environmen-

tal ethics attempt to establish the principle that preservation of nature must take precedence
to satisfy human needs. See also P. EHRLICH & A. EHRLICH, EXTINCTION: THE CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISAPPEARANCE OF SPECIES (1981).
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by a "preservation at all cost" strategy because we cannot distinguish
between species which are endangered through conditions created by
nature and those created by man." In addition, ecologists themselves increasingly view concepts such as diversity, stability, and equilibrium as
problematic and perhaps meaningless." At best, economic and scientific
justifications for preserving endangered species are a warning to man to
guard against drastically reducing species diversity.
Because economic and scientific justifications for preserving endangered species do not support a consistent preference for species preservation over exploitation, efforts to preserve endangered species can be
justified on non-utilitarian or moral grounds. We are often trapped into
thinking exclusively in terms of scientific and economic values to justify
programs that depart from these values. The point about environmental
protection generally is that it is the outcome of what many see as a fundamental shift in values. We cannot foresee the angle of repose from this
shift; but enough of a transition in the popular thinking has occured to
simply recognize it. The benefit of this justification is that one need not
accept all of the premises of the more radical or "deep ecology" movement that inanimate objects have rights." One need only conclude, in John
11. See generally J. KRUTILLA & A. FISHER, THE ECONOMICS OF NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS: STUDIES IN THE VALUATION OF COMMUNITY AND AMENITY RESOURCES (1975).
12. Hulbert, The Nonconcept of Species Diversity: A Critique and Alternative
ECOLOGY 577 (1971).
13. See, e.g., Regan, The Nature and Possibilityof an EnvironmentalEthic, 3 ENVTL.
ETHICS 31 (1981). Other recent theories have been constructed based on Aldo Leopold's classic

Parameters,52
A

SAND COUNTY ALMANAC

(1966) (an attempt to attribute rights to animals and even in-

animate objects). See McDaniel, PhysicalMatteras Creative andSentient, 5 ENVTL. ETHICS
291 (1983); Taylor, The Ethics ofRespect for Nature, 3 ENVT'L ETHICS 197 (1981) and Taylor,
In Defense of Biocentrism, 5 ENvTL. ETHICS 237 (1983). These theories do not stand up,
however, to rigorous analysis. See Pluhar, The Justificationof an Environmental Ethic, 5
ENVTL. ETHICS 47 (1983) and Watson, A Critique of Anti-Anthropocentric Biocentrism, 5
ENVTL. ETHICS 245 (19831. See also Rolston, Is There an EcologicalEthic?, in ETHICS AND
THE ENVIRONMENT 41 (D. Scherer & T. Attig eds. 1983).
The major objection to a limitless theory of rights for animals and inanimate objects
is this:
The relationship between the individual interests of organisms, individual
plants, and nonliving objects, on the one hand, and the healthy functioning
and integrity of the ecosystem, on the other hand, is a contingent one. Actions
which damage an environmentally sensitive area usually or always damage
some individuals or some species. This fact accounts no doubt, for the persistence of suggestions that the recognition of interests and rights of nonhuman
objects is a useful basis for a new environmental consciousness or ethic. But
environmental destruction need not result in harm to any individual. It is possible to accept a humane ethic extended as broadly as one wishes and take this
ethic to require steps to protect all individuals affected, rather than to protect
the habitat, the community, or the ecosystem in question. Once the contingency
of this relationship is recognized, the temptation is to continue the expansion
of rights to apply to greater portions of the environment- hence, the implausible suggestions that all existent things have rights. This seems to ensure that,
whenever the environment is damaged, some rights holder will be affected and
the rights-based ethic will become relevant. This ploy works only at the expense of trivializing the environmental ethic in question. Every action with
environmental consequences must, on this view, affect some rights holder. If
this result is not to be totally paralyzing, there must be some means of deciding
which actions are to be prohibited from those which need not be. And since
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Passmore's words, that in a heightened appreciation of the benefits of
biological diversity "the onus is on anyone who seeks to modify an
ecosystem's degree of diversity and that he has to produce a far more
elaborate and complex argument than has ordinarily been supposed."' 4
Thus the heightened appreciation of biological diversity, as evidenced in
our legislation, has created a "presumption" in favor of protecting endangered species. Lawyers are comfortable with presumptions and the
burdens of proof and persuasion. As imprecise and open-ended as presumptions are, they do avoid absolute choices that may, even in the short-run,
turn out to be wrong. Ultimately, the "presumption" in favor of protecting endangered species recognizes some duty toward future generations,
but avoids the impossible task of trying to calculate the present as against
future values of endangered species.
Purpose
The Endangered Species Act relies primarily on protecting individual
species to preserve biological diversity. The Act's habitat protection manthe original use of the terms rights and interests applies to human rights and
interests, no guidance for behavior is forthcoming from those concepts alone,
as the analogy with human rights and interests have been abandoned.
Norton, Environmental Ethics and Nonhuman Rights, 4 ENVTL. ETHICS 17, 32-33 (1982).
Cf Miller, Do Animals Have Interests Worthy of Our Moral Interests?, 5 ENVTL. ETHICS
319 (1983).
One commentator has taken the theory of unlimited rights for animals and objects to
its logical but unacceptable conclusion:
Man will, in the foreseeable future, confront the moral obligation to make
himself extinct - to commit racial suicide. He will lie under a duty to preserve
nature: that is, the life process and the earth. And the only way in which this
obligation can be discharged is by man decreeing his own extinction.
Jenkins, Nature's Rights and Man's Duties, in LAW AND THE ECOLOGICAL CHALLENGE 91

(E. Dais ed. 1978). In MAN'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATURE, Passmore states:
I agree, in the long run, with the Stoics: if men were to decide that they ought
to treat plants, animals, landscapes precisely as if they were persons, if they
were to think of them as forming with man a moral community in a strict
sense, that would make it impossible to civilize the world-or, one might add,
to act at all or even to continue living.
J. PASSMORE, supra note 8, at 126.
14. J. PASSMORE, supra note 8, at 121. An interesting link between species diversity
and human freedom and dignity is made in Rodman, Four Formsof EcologicalConsciousness
Reconsidered,in ETHICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 82, 91 (D. Scherer and T. Attig eds. 1983):
Since the cluster of value-giving principles applies generally throughout the
world to living natural entities and systems, it applies to human beings and
human societies as well as to the realm of nonhuman nature. To the extent
that diversity or an individual human level is threatened by the pressures of
conformity in mass society, and diversity of social ways of life is threatened
by the pressures of global resource exploitation and an ideology of worldwide
"development" in whose name indigenous peoples are being exterminated along
with native forests, it would be short-sighted to think of "ecological issues"
as unrelated to "social issues." From an ecological point of view, one of the
most striking socio-political phenomena of the twentieth century-the rise of
totalitarian dictatorships that forcibly try to eliminate the natural condition
of human diversity in the name of some mono-cultural ideal (e.g., an Aryan
Europe or a classless society)-is not so much a freakish aberration from
modern history as it is an intensification of the general spirit of the age.
Ecological sensibility, then is "holistic" in a sense beyond that usually thought
of: it grasps the underlying principles that manifest themselves in what are
ordinarily perceived as separate "social" and "environmental" issues.
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date incorporates habitat preservation strategies as well.' 5 These strategies are less pronounced than those protecting national park and
wilderness systems, but habitat protection is becoming a significant potential constraint on many development activities. Moreover, unlike the National Environmental Policy Act, 6 the Endangered Species Act imposes
substantive as well as procedural duties on federal agencies. 7
The Act's objective of conserving endangered species includes the entire biological community: animals, fish, insects (other than pests), and
plants."8 A species' extinction need not be imminent to be protected.' 9 For
instance, a species is deemed threatened when it is likely to become an
endangered species in the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range.2" Effectively, to preserve a species, its habitat
allows the Secretary
must be protected from destruction, and the statute
21
to "list" endangered or threatened habitats.
ProtectionMechanisms
There are three major protection mechanisms in the statute. These
are (1) listing, (2) agency consultation and protection duties, and (3) the
prohibition against takings which is independent of any federal agency
action.22

The Secretary may "list" an endangered or threatened species and
its habitat after completing the rulemaking process. 2 Interested citizens
may also initiate the listing process. "Listing" triggers the full range of
protection measures under the Act, and a decision to list a species is made
on the basis of any of the following factors:
(1) the present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of a species habitat or range;
15. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3) (1982) provides:
The Secretary, by regulation promulgated in accordance with subsection (b)
of this section and to the maximum extent prudent and determinable(A) shall, concurrently with making a determination under paragraph
(1)that a species is an endangered species or a threatened species, designate
any habitat of such species which is then considered to be critical habitat; and
(B) may, from time-to-time thereafter as appropriate, revise such designation.
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982).
17. A considerable debate exists whether NEPA imposes substantive as well as procedural duties, but the Supreme Court has shown little inclination to encourage the development of a substantive law of NEPA. See, e.g., Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc.
v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980). For a summary of the debate and post-Strycker cases see
F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY
752-64 (1984).
18. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1982). The term endangered species is defined as "any species
which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range other
than a species of the Class Insecta determined by the Secretary to constitute a pest whose
protection under the provisions of this chapter would present an overwhelming and overriding risk to man." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (1982).
19. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20) (1982).
20. Id.

21. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(c) (1982).
22. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1982).
23. Id.
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(2) overutilizing for commercial, recreational, scientific, or educational purposes;
(3) disease or predation;
(4) the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or
(5) other natural
or manmade factors affecting its continued
2
existence.
The Endangered Species Act requires that a listing decision be based
on the best scientific and commerical data available. 5 Economic considerations are expressly excluded from front-end listing decisions. 26 This will
preclude judical challenges to listing decisions because of the Secretary's
failure to take economic impacts into account. Economic considerations
are, however, relevant to back-end protection decisions because they may
be taken into account in the exemption process.27
The term critical habitat for a threatened or endangered species is
defined as:
(i) the specific areas within the geographical area occupied by the
species, at the time it is listed in accordance with the provisions
of Section 1533 of this title, on which are found those physical
or biological features (I) essential to the conservation of the species
and (II) which may require special management considerations or
protection; and
(ii) specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by the
species at the time it is listed in accordance with the provisions
of Section 1533 of this title, upon a determination by the Secretary
that such areas are essential for the conservation of the species.2 8
This definition of habitat is the result of a 1978 amendment to the Act
which narrows the protected habitat to areas necessary for the species
survival. 29 The restrictive definition of habitat precludes the Department
of the Interior from designating the entire range of a species as critical
except when necessary to protect small, confined populations. Although
24. 16 U.S.C. § 15331a)(1)(A)-(E (1982).
25. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (1982) states that:

The Secretary shall designate critical habitat, and make revisions thereto,
under subsection (a)(3) of this section on the basis of the best scientific data
available and after taking into consideration the economic impact, and any
other relevant impact, of specifying any particular area as critical habitat.
The secretary may exclude any area from critical habitat if he determines that
the benefits of such exclusion outweigh the benefits of specifying such area
as part of the critical habitat, unless he determines, based on the best scientific and commercial data available, that the failure to designate such area
as critical habitat will result in the extinction of the species concerned.
26. H.R. REP. No. 697, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 159 (1978), reprintedin 1979 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2557, 2576.
27. With some exceptions Congress has chosen to allow agencies to set environmental
standards without regard to the cost and feasibility of compliance in order to place the burden
on specific affected individuals to prove that a variance is warranted.
28. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A) (1982).
29. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1982).
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habitats may be listed, in contrast to species listing decisions, economic
considerations are relevant.3 0
An agency or a private licensee must obtain a biological assessment
of whether a species will be jeopardized from the Fish and Wildlife
Service.3 The assessment must be based on the best scientific evidence
available." Once completed, the biological assessment becomes the pivotal
scientific evidence around which subsequent disputes will be resolved.
Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act is the heart of the Act's
species protection scheme. Section 7 requires an agency or license applicant to consult with the Secretary of the Interior before undertaking action which may jeopardize an endangered or threatened species.3 ' The consultation process is designed to provide the Secretary with a scientific
basis to decide whether and how the Act should be applied to an activity.
consult with the Secretary will result in a project being
Failure to
2
enjoined.
The Secretary and the relevant parties must complete the consultation process within 90 days after it is initiated. Based on the biological
assessment, the Secretary must issue a written opinion on whether or not
the activity will jeopardize a threatened or endangered species. A variety
of "jeopardy conclusions" from no jeopardy to complete jeopardy are
possible.3 If the Secretary concludes that the project will have adverse
consequences upon an endangered or threatened species, "the Secretary
shall suggest reasonable and prudent alternatives which he believes would
not violate" the section 7 prohibition against jeopardizing the continued
existence of a species or destroying or adversely modifying a species
30. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (1982).
31. Section 7(d) provides:
After initiation of consultation required of this section, under subsection (a)(2)
the Federal agency and the permit or license applicant shall not make any
irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources with respect to the agency
action which has the effect of foreclosing the formulation or implementation
of any reasonable and prudent alternative measures which would not violate
subsection (a)(2) of this section.
16 U.S.C. § 1536(d) (1982).
32. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
33. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1982). The following definition of "jeopardize" has been offered:
A reasonable definition of "jeopardize" is any substantial harm to any population segment of any listed species. That a species is listed as endangered itself
indicates that any adverse effect could contribute to its extinction. The use
of "jeopardize" in the statute instead of "result in extinction" suggests that
Congress contemplated a less demanding standard. The administrative interpretation, which is entitled to some deference, takes a middle-of-the-road approach: an agency action does not "comply if it might be expected to result
in a reduction in the number or distribution of that species of sufficient
magnitude to place the species in jeopardy, or restrict the potential and
reasonable expansion or recovery of that species .. " Since an endangered
species is already in jeopardy and a threatened species is close to it, only a
de minimus impact on the species should be tolerable in applying section 7.
Coggins and Russell, supra note 2, at 1465.
34. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1982).
35. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3XA) (1982).
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habitat.3" These alternatives are implemented either by the federal agency or the applicant seeking a federal license.
In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hil4A7 the Supreme Court concluded that the legislative purpose of section 7 revealed
an explicit congressional decision to require agencies to afford first
priority to the declared national policy of saving endangered
species. The pointed omission of the type of qualifying language
previously included in endangered species legislation reveals a conscious decision by Congress to give endangered species priority
over the "primary missions" of federal agencies. 8
The mandate to agencies to protect endangered species under Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Hill remains unchanged, despite the 1982 amendment
of section 7.39 Prior to 1982, agencies had a duty to ensure that a species
would not be "threatened." After 1982, the duty is to ensure that the agency action is "not likely to jeopardize" the species. In a recent opinion,
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit attributed no
substantive significance to the 1982 language because in the court's view
intend to change the absolute substantive mandate
the Congress did not
4
confirmed in Hill. 0
In addition to the section 7 consultation and protection duties, section 9 of the Act provides an independent source of federal authority over
activities which jeopardize endangered species. Section 9 makes it unlawful
to "take" an endangered species within the United States or territorial
area of the United States.41
Theoretically, each time an endangered species is killed by a project,
a section 9 violation occurs. The section 9 prohibition against "takings"
has been characterized as double jeopardy because an activity, such as
a water diversion project, could be in violation of the Act even though
it received section 7 clearance. Support for this proposition can be found
36. Id.
37. 437 U.S. 153 (1982).
38. 437 U.S. at 185. See Coggins, Conserving Wildlife Resources: An Overview of the

Endangered Species Act of 1973, 51 N.D.L. REV. 315 (1975); Note, Obligations of Federal
Agencies Under Section 7 of the EndangeredSpecies Act of 1973, 28 STAN. L. REv. 124 (1976).
39. See infra text accompanying notes 54-57.
40. Roosevelt Campbello Island Int'l Park v. EPA, 684 F.2d 1041 (1st Cir. 1982):
Although the 1978 Amendments to ESA softened the obligation on an agency from requiring the agency to "insure" the species would not be jeopardized
to requiring the agency to "insure" that jeopardy is not "likely," [citation]
the legislative intent was that the Act "continues to give the benefit of the
doubt to the species." [citation] Agencies continue to be under a substantive
mandate to use of "all methods and procedures which are necessary," [citation] "to prevent the loss of any endangered species regardless of the cost."
[citation] The Act does, however, create a special "exemption" procedure...
designed to allow necessary actions even if they threaten the loss of an endangered species.
Id. at 1048-49. See generally Comment, Endangered Species Act Amendment of 1978: A CongressionalResponse to Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 5 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 283 (1982.
41. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (1982).
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in Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and Resources. 4 Hawaii maintained a feral goat and sheep herd in a game reserve that overlapped the
designated critical habitat of the Palila bird, a finch-billed member of the
Honeycreeper family unique to the Islands. The goats and sheep were
eating up the forest, and the Sierra Club, on behalf of the Palila bird sued
to compel Hawaii to graze the animals elsewhere. The district court held
that the state's maintenance of the herd in an area that endangered the
Palla was a section 9 taking. The state's argument that it owned all its
wildlife in trust for the public and thus the tenth amendment
prohibited
43
application of the Endangered Species Act were rejected.
Section 9's sting has been somewhat lessened by 1982 amendments
which established an exemption process to reduce section 9 conflicts. The
Secretary of the Interior may grant a permit for a section 9 "taking" if
he finds that:
(i) the taking will be incidental;
(ii) the applicant will, to the maximum extent practicable, minimize
and mitigate the impacts of such taking;
(iii) the applicant will ensure that adequate funding for the plan
will be provided;
(iv) the taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species in the wild....
Judicial Review
Biological assessments are subject to judicial review under the arbitrary and capricious standard. Courts have shown considerable deference
to the conclusions reached in biological assessments when the Fish and
Wildlife Service recommends measures to mitigate the consequences of
a project on an endangered or threatened species. 2 Even in the "hard look"
mode,416 the circumstances in which a court will second guess the Fish and
Wildlife experts are rare. The courts will intervene, however, where a
42. 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979), aff'd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
43. Palila, 471 F. Supp. at 992-95.
44. 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (1982).
45. Cabinet Mountains Wilderness/Scotchman's Peak Grizzly Bears v. Peterson, 685
F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1982); North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Cf Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 589 F. Supp. 113 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (no
section 9 taking for real state development because developer's plan to transfer eighty-eight
percent of the habitat of endangered butterfly to public ownerships would enhance its survival.
46. The "hard look doctrine" was originated by the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit. The doctrine is an attempt to promote agencies' rationality by imposing on their decisions the appellate opinion model. Lawyers are trained
to develop an argument logically from the initial to the final step. All of the assumptions
and assertions must be made explicit. Prior to the 1970's, administrative agency reasoning
seldom achieved this artificial but rigorous standard. Thus, it is not surprising that when
the federal judiciary set out to reform the administrative process it decided to hold the agencies
to the same standards of analysis to which lawyers have long held judges. See Note, Recent
Changes in the Scope of JudicialControl Over AdministrativeMethods of Decisionmaking,
49 IND. L.J. 118 (1973). The theory and current state of the doctrine are explored in F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A.D. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 103-18
(1984).
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challenger proves that the decision was not based on the best scientific
evidence available. Under the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, the courts7
have sometimes defined "available" as available after further research'
and these decisions have influenced at least one court. In Roosevelt Campobello Island Park Commission v. EnvironmentalProtectionAgency the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed an administrative law judge's conclusion that the risk of harm to endangered
whales from oil spills was remote because it was not based on the best
scientific evidence.4 8 The court held that sophisticated, computer simulation studies simulating various navigation conditions, were necessary. 9
Congress has provided some flexibility in the consultation process
which in turn gives the courts some remedial discretion in reviewing decisions under the Act. For instance, Congress was concerned that scientific
uncertainty would force the Fish and Wildlife Service to issue negative
biological opinions and thus block projects.50 This possibility has been
limited by making the consultation process an on-going one. 1 This rolling process is important in multi-stage projects, where the first stage of
a project may be allowed to proceed during the period of consultation.
But as a district court reviewing the likely effect of an outer continental
oil and gas lease sale on endangered whales observed: "A negative
biological opinion, however, does not render section 7(d) inapplicable. If
new information develops which indicates that an endangered species
might be threatened, section 7(d) would prohibit the further irreversible
or irretrievable commitment of resources until consultation is reinitiated
and a new biological opinion prepared."52 The Act does not simply allow
the agency to continue collecting information, however. It requires that
the agency have a plan to avoid jeopardy and that any private parties
may be put on notice that subsequent activities may have to be modified
or even terminated should they jeopardize a species."
47. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 655 F.2d 318 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
48. 684 F.2d 1041 (1st Cir. 1982).
49. Id. at 1051-53. Accord Village of False Pass v. Watt, 565 F. Supp. 1123 D. Alaska
1983) (threats to endangered waters must be continually assessed). See also County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1977).
50. See EndangeredSpecies Act Amendments, 1982: Hearingon S. 2309Before the Subcomm. on EnvironmentalPollution of the Senate Comm. on Environmentand Public Works,

97th Cong., 2d. Sess. 191-96 (1982) (statement of Roland Fischer, Colorado River Water Conversation District).
51. See infra notes 52-53.

52. Village of False Pass v. Watt, 565 F. Supp. 1123, 1155 (D. Alaska 1983). See also
North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332 (D.D.C. 1980) affd but reversed on other
grounds, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
53. Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1984). A district court has
recently announced a "futile call" exception to the agency's consultation duties. The Forest
Service proposed to construct a gravel road in the Nez Perce National Forest in Idaho in
an area that was suitable for the endangered Rocky Mountain Grey Wolf. After the Service
determined that no wolves were present in the area surrounding the road, it did not request
information on other endangered species as required by 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1982). The court
conceded that the Forest Service breached a duty to consult, but refused to enjoin the road
because there was no evidence that additional information on jeopardy would have been produced. But, the result "would likely" have been different had the Forest Service denied the
potential presence of the wolf or lacked adequate knowledge to make such a conclusion.
Thomas v. Pederson, 21 ENV'T REP. CAS. (BNA) 1275 (D. Idaho 1984).
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The Exemption Process
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill provoked a great controversy in
Congress which led to the enactment of amendments to the Endangered
Species Act.5" Senator Howard Baker was able to save the Tellico Dam
for his state by a specific exemption, 5 but Congress also chose to introduce
some general flexibility into the back-end of the protection process. The
amendments contain a two-tiered exemption process that places the
burden on an agency or private applicant to show that the value of the
activity outweighs the protection of a species. After the consultation process is completed, an ad hoc review board is convened by the Secretary
of the Interior. If there was a good faith effort to resolve the conflict during the consultation process, and the conflict is deemed irresolvable, the
exemption application goes to a cabinet level Endangered Species Committee which reviews the board's record. 6 The Committee's discretion is
limited by substantive standards of the statute which require that:
(i) there are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency
action;
(ii) the benefits of such action clearly outweigh the benefits of alternative courses of action consistent with conserving the species
or its critical habitat, and such action is in the public interest;
iiii) the action is of regional or national significance; and
(iv) neither the Federal agency concerned nor the exemption applicant made any irreversible or irretrievable commitment of
resources prohibited by subsection (d) of this section; and
(v) it establishes such reasonable mitigation and enhancement
measures, including, but not limited to, live propagation,
transplantation, and habitat acquisition and improvement, as are
necessary and appropriate to minimize the adverse effects of the
species, threatened species,
agency action upon the endangered
7
or critical habitat concerned.1
In short, the Endangered Species Act protects listed endangered or
threatened species and their habitats in two ways. Section 7 requires all
agencies that undertake activities that may jeopardize a species or its
habitat to consult with the Secretary of the Interior. He has the authority to deny clearance for the activity or to allow it to go forward, often
with mitigation conditions. Section 9 is a flat prohibition against all activities, public or private, that result in the taking of a species and both
sections have variance procedures.
SECTION 404

OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT

Section 404 of the Clean Water Act 8 establishes a joint Corps of
Engineers-Environmental Protection Agency regulatory program for the
54.
55.
56.
57.

Amendments to the Endangered Species Act, Pub. L. 97-304, 96 Stat. 1417 (1982).
Coggins and Russell, supra note 2, at 1482 n.433.
16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)-(p) (1982).
16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(7)(A) (1982).

58. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982).
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discharge of dredge and fill into navigable waters. Section 404 permits
are issued by the Corps of Engineers subject to a veto by the Environmental Protection Agency." The Corps' jurisdiction extends to "navigable
waters," which is defined broadly to include all surface bodies of waters
and associated wetlands."' Western water interests have been fairly well
accommodated in the section 404 procedure. For instance, a number of
exemptions including normal farming and soil and water conservation
6
practices, irrigation ditches, and return flows are included. ' Also, a section 404 permit is only required for major new water diversion projects.
2
It does not apply to the operation of existing facilities.
Section 404 regulations list a number of substantive criteria for granting a permit. As one would expect, the primary purpose of the regulations
63
is to limit dredge and fill activities to water-dependent activities. The
that
study
interest
public
major standard of review is an all-encompassing
enits
against
project
of
the
benefits
the
balance
to
Corps
the
allows
vironmental costs.6 The major unresolved issue, however, is the extent
to which the Corps can take into account environmental impacts other
than those directly caused by dredge and fill activities.
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
AND WESTERN WATER RIGHTS

The Endangered Species Act effectively creates de facto regulatory
water rights.60 That is, the federal government now has a new basis to
claim that specific but undetermined amounts of water either be released
from a reservoir or not be impounded. The closest the Act comes to
recognizing any property rights is in section 5 where the federal government is allowed to acquire land and other resources to protect a species
and its habitat.66 De facto regulatory water rights differ significantly from
59. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e(1) (1982).
60. The Corps is no longer bound by the historic chain of interstate commerce test.
See Wyoming v. Hoffman, 437 F. Supp. 114 (D. Wyo. 1977); Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke,

578 F. 2d 742 (9th Cir. 1978); and United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368 (10th
Cir. 1979). The latest definition of navigable waters can be found at 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(a) (1983).
Courts are less convinced that Congress intended to assert its full constitutional power over
associated wetlands, and thus assertions of jurisdiction over low-lying areas that sometimes
become saturated with water have been set aside. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
Inc., 729 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1984); cf. Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.
2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983).
61. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1) (1982).

62. Section 404 is only triggered by the discharge of dredge and fill material into
navigable waters. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1976).
63. 33 C.F.R. § 320 (1984). See Atlantic LTD v. Hudson, 574 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Va.
1983). Neither the Clean Water Act nor due process require a trial-type hearing. Buttrey
v. United States, 690 F.2d 1170 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2087 (1983).
64. See Parish and Morgan, History, Practiceand Emerging Problems of Wetlands
Regulation:Reconstructing Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 17 LAND & WATER L. REV.
43 (1982).
65. See Endangered Species Oversight, 1982: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Pollutionof the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 97th Cong.,

lst Sess. 311 (1982) (statement of D. Craig Bell, Executive Director, Western States Water
Council).
66. 16 U.S.C. § 1534 (1982).
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proprietary rights whether held by the government or by private entities.
All property rights share common characteristics, but it is necessary to
emphasize the differences between regulatory and proprietary water rights
to understand western fears about integrating these rights with traditional
state-created water rights.
Traditional Western Water Law
Western states follow the law of prior appropriation (subject to dual
riparian rights in California, Nebraska, Texas, and Washington). Prior appropriation is premised on the following assumptions: (1) waters are owned
in trust for the public so that the acquisition of private rights can be
regulated and hence all water rights are usufructuary; (2) the optimal use
of water will be served by a system which maximizes private use of water
and minimizes public use for purposes such as instream flow maintenance;
(3) private rights should be as secure as possible subject to the dubious
but well established principle that claims cannot be asserted for speculative purposes;' (4) rights are based on the priority of application to a
beneficial use, subject to relation back to the date of filing, and endure
so long as the claimant applies the water to a beneficial use and does not
abandon the use or suffer a fortfeiture; and (5) the whole stream may be
diverted during times of peak demand to satisfy calls on it and a call may
only be rejected by the stream administrator if it would be futile.6"
Public rights are common in western water law. Historically, public
rights specify the types of permitted and prohibited activity that can take
place with respect to a water body. Such rights do not directly give the
right holder, the government, an entitlement to a specific quantity of
water. For example, the public has long had the right to make use of
navigable waters for commercial and recreational purposes.69 Public proprietary rights also exist in the West with federal reserved Indian and
non-Indian rights as the most important public proprietary rights.7"
Public water rights have been generally accepted because of their long
history,' but western water lawyers have been troubled by federalreserved public proprietary water rights for theoretical and practical
reasons. Theoretically, federal-reserved proprietary water rights are mules.
They have hybrid appropriative and riparian characteristics. They have
67. Williams, The Requirement of Beneficial Use as a Cause of Waste in Water Resource
Development, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 7 (1983).
68. W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 576-83

(1971).
69. C. MEYERS & A. TARLOCK, WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 1021-51 (2d ed. 1980).

70. Reserved rights were first recognized as a judicial contribution to the then prevailing federal Indian policy of integrating Indians into white civilization. See Winters v. United
States, 207 U.S. 564 11908).
71. The assertion of public rights to tidelands long thought to be free from the public
trust poses difficult problems. California has aggressively asserted the public trust over
tidelands held by private patentees and their successors in interest. The state supreme court
has upheld these assertions, but the Supreme Court recently invalidated the state's assertion of a trust easement over tidelands long confirmed in private ownership pursuant to the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Summa Corp. v. California, 104 S. Ct. 1751 (1984).
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a priority date and entitle the holder to a fixed quantity of water like appropriative rights. But, they also have riparian characteristics; i.e., the
right depends on federal land ownership rather than on the application
of water to a beneficial use. These characteristics have given rise to the
concern that huge amounts of water will be claimed by their beneficiaries:
Indian tribes and federal land management agencies. The fear of western
states is that the exercise of these "phantom" rights will destabilize the
intricate fabric of western water allocation. To date, these fears have
proven groundless (1) because reserved rights mimic private water rights
and thus have internal, self-limiting characteristics, and (2) because of
judicial and Congressional hostility to their recognition.7"
Like private water rights, federal-reserved rights are limited because
they have a priority date; namely the date reserving the public land for
a water-related purpose. In addition, the holder of the federal-reserved
rights can only claim the minimum amount of water necessary to support the purpose 3 and the rights depend upon a congressional claim. In
United States v. New Mexico,74 Justice Rehnquist articulated a high standard for finding congressional claims. An implied congressional intent for
a claim will only be found when a reserved right is necessary to prevent
the frustration of the primary purpose of water-related reservation.7 5
As this brief overview of western water law demonstrates, federalreserved water rights are limited and are disfavored by the Congress and
the judiciary. To understand western fears about federal claims under the
Endangered Species Act and section 404 of the Clean Water Act, one only needs to appreciate how limited and interrelated with state water allocation systems federal reserved-rights are as compared to "unclaimed"
federal regulatory rights under federal environmental protection acts.
Ironically, restrictions on the federal government's reserved water
rights create pressures to resort to "unclaimed" federal regulatory rights
as an end-run around these restrictions. The recent Supreme Court case
5
of Nevada v. United States,"
illustrates how restrictions on the exercise
of federal-reserved water rights would encourage a party to use federal
regulatory rights to achieve its purpose.
In 1913, the federal government brought an action both to claim reserved rights for the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation and to establish
water rights for the proposed Newlands reclamation project on the Truckee
River in Nevada. All the water users on the Truckee River were named
72. See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
73. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976) (protection of endangered species).
74. 438 U.S. 696 1978. The Court has similarly restricted the reserved rights of Indians who have a more legitimate claim to western waters than the federal government.
Arizona v. California, 103 S. Ct. 1382 (1983); Nevada v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2906 (1983).
See infra text accompanying notes 76-84 for a discussion of these two cases. See also Arizona
v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 104 S. Ct. 209 (1983).
75. See Tarlock and Fairfax. No Water For the Woods: A CriticalAnalysis of United
States v. New Mexico, 15 IDAHo L. REV. 509 (1979).

76. 103 S. Ct. 2906 (1983).
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as defendants. After a prolonged and interrupted history, the "Orr Ditch"
litigation culminated when the district court entered a final settlement
decree in 1944, adjudicating the water rights of the Tribe and the project.7 7
In 1973 the federal government sought to open the "Orr Ditch" decree
to claim reserved water rights to maintain the Pyramid Lake fishery."8
The district court held that the 1944 decree was res judicata to all new
claims, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that the owners of the Newlands project lands, now under the management of the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District, were not bound by the
decree. The court held that the government breached its fiduciary duty
to the Tribe by both representing the conflicting interests of the Tribe
and the proposed project beneficiaries. 9
The Court of Appeals' conclusion was unanimously reversed by the
Supreme Court. In Nevada v. United States," the Supreme Court held
that: (1) the federal government cannot reallocate water from project
beneficiaries because landowners are the beneficial owners of the water
rights;8 ' (2) "the government does not 'compromise' its obligation to one
interest that Congress obliges it to represent by the mere fact that it
simultaneously performs another task for another interest that Congress
has obligated it by statute to do";82 and (3) res judicata bars an action
by and binds parties who were not parties to an original reserved rights
decree."3
The most significant holding in Nevada is that parties which were not
parties to the original 1913 suit were bound by the "Orr Ditch" decree:
Orr Ditch was an equitable action to quiet title, an in personam
action. But as the Court of Appeals determined, it "was no garden
variety quiet title action." As we have already explained, everyone
involved in Orr Ditch contemplated a comprehensive adjudication
of water rights intended to settle once and for all the question of
how much of the Truckee River each of the litigants was entitled
to. Thus, even though quiet title actions are in personam actions,
water adjudications are more in the nature of in rem proceedings.
Nonparties such as the subsequent appropriators in this case have
relied just as much on the OrrDitch decree in participating in the
development of western Nevada as have the parties of that case.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that under "these circumstances it would be manifestly unjust.., not to permit subsequent appropriators to hold the reservation to the claims it made
77. Id. at 2912.
78. Id.
79. United States v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 649 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1981),
modified, 666 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1982), reversed 103 S. Ct. 2906 (1983).
80. 103 S. Ct. at 2925.
81. Id. at 2914, citing, Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82 (1937) and Nebraska v. Wyoming,

325 U.S. 589 (1945).
82. Nevada v. United States, 103 S. Ct. at 2917.
83. Id. at 2918.
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in OrrDitch;any other conclusion would make it impossible ever
finally to quantify a reserved water right.8 4
This holding can be defended on the basis that holders of state-created
property rights have a legitimate expectation that the ground rules under
which the rights were acquired will not be changed. Western water rights
may be trimmed if the use ceases or if the use is found to be wasteful,
but not simply because a new and "higher" user appears. The expectation of security is especially high if the fight is between private statecreated rights and federal-reserved rights that mimic state rights. As illustrated in Nevada v. United States, if a choice must be made between
adding federal measures and reallocating project water vested under state
law to protect a Tribe, it seems fair that the federal government bear the
burden of its trust duties. This result shows the extent to which federal
water rights are limited and the attraction to resort to federal unclaimed
"regulatory-reserved rights."
IntegratingRegulatory Property Rights
and State Water Rights
The existence of regulatory rights under the Endangered Species Act
and section 404 of the Clean Water Act raises the following issue: whether
private expectations that the gound-rules under which state water rights
are acquired will not be changed are equally as strong when the federal
government exercises its constitutional power retroactively to regulate
in the public interest. A tentative answer is no. What seems to be emerging out of recent water adjudications is that state-created water rights
are not different from any other property rights despite the vast energy
dissipated by western water lawyers to will a contrary result. Thus, state
water rights are not immune from the retroactive application of state
police power or of federal constitutional authority.8s
The application of the public trust doctrine, long thought to be confined if not mired in submerged lands beneath navigable waters, to water
diversions is the most dramatic example of the retroactive application of
state police power to water rights. Initially, a few state court decisions
suggested that the public trust doctrine applied to the state's power to
approve limited new appropriations."6 Building on these precedents, the
California Supreme Court squarely held in NationalAudubon Society v.
Superior Court of Alpine County"7 that the doctrine applied to all appropriative rights and thus that the doctrine retroactively applied to new
and existing, vested appropriative water rights.
84. Id. at 2925.
85. See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322
(1979).
86. See, e.g., Ritter v. Standal, 98 Idaho 446, 566 P.2d 769 (1977). It has also been held
that the state retains the power to subject new appropriations to a public trust standard.
United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d
457 (N.D. 1976).
87. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983).
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The state has an affirmative duty to take the public trust into
account in the planning and allocation of water resources, and to
protect public trust uses whenever feasible. Just as the history
of this state shows that appropriation may be neccessary for efficient use of water despite unavoidable harm to public trust values,
it demonstrates that an appropriative water rights system administered without consideration of the public trust may cause
unnecessary and unjustified harm to trust interests. As a matter
of practical necessity, the state may have to approve appropriations despite foreseeable harm to public trust uses. In so doing,
however, the state must bear in mind its duty as trustee to consider the effect of the taking on the public trust and to preserve,
so far as consistent with the public interest, the uses protected
by the trust.
Once the state has approved an appropriation, the public trust
imposes a duty of continuing supervision over the taking and use
of the appropriated water. In exercising its sovereign power to
allocate water resources in the public interest, the state is not confined by past allocation decisions which may be incorrect in light
of current knowledge or inconsistent with current needs. 8
California's approach can be faulted because the court has knowingly introduced great instability into an intricate web of property rights with
insufficient legislative guidance. NationalAudubon was decided shortly
after the California legislature declined to act on the changes in California water law recommended by a blue ribbon commission. The same criticism cannot be made of the Endangered Species Act and section 404 of
the Clean Water Act. Originally, Congress did not consider the impact
of these regulatory programs on state water law, but ultimately it did.
Both programs are typical of federal environmental statutes that are simply superimposed on existing institutions. If Congress considered the problem at all initially, the most likely assumption is that it thought that the
courts would resolve serious conflicts by holding that there had been a
fifth amendment taking of private property. This conclusion is becoming
more and more remote as the Supreme Court continues to muddle through
the problem of when a regulation is a taking. 89
Western states made Congress aware of the potential conflict between
environmental regulation and state water management as soon as conflicts started to emerge.8 0 Congress has reacted to the concerns of western
states, but in a manner that makes integration of regulatory property
rights with state-created water rights difficult. For instance, Congress
has not chosen to modify the primary objectives of environmental statutes.
Thus the power of federal agencies to create regulatory property rights
remains intact. Instead, Congress has vacillated between merely express88. Id. at 448, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364-65.
89. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
90. See supra notes 6, 65.
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ing hope that there will be no conflict and placing a heavy burden on
holders of state-created rights to show that there has been an impairment
of rights.
Congress' strongest accommodation of western water interests in environmental statues is found in section 101(g) of the Clean Water Act:
It is the policy of Congress that the authority of each State
to allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be
superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired by this chapter. It
is further the policy of Congress that nothing in this chapter shall
be construed to supersede or abrogate rights to quantities of water
which have been established by any State. Federal agencies shall
cooperate with State and local agencies to develop comprehensive
solutions to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution in concert with
programs for managing water resources.9 '
The language of the statute is less than clear about its effect, and the
remarks of its chief9 2sponsor, Senator Malcolm Wallop of Wyoming, are
equally ambiguous.
Section 101(g) responded to somewhat vague western fears that the
technology-forcing standards of the Clean Water Act would prevent many
existing discharges to the detriment of downstream water rights holders.
Congress lacked sufficient information to gauge the extent to which federal
water quality protection programs might displace state water right holders
and it did not attempt to address systematically all possible water qualityquantity relationships. Under section 101(g), states were not given a veto
over federal quality standards and federal agencies were enjoined to try
to accommodate state and federal objectives. One commentator has suggested that federal regulation may condition state water rights so long
as the conditions are imposed to carry out the intended purposes of the
regulations.'"
In 1982 a major effort was made to weaken the Endangered Species
Act. One proposed amendment would have added a section to the Act
identical to section 101(g). In the end, Congress chose to impose a much
weaker cooperation duty on the Department of the Interior: "It is further declared to be the policy of Congress that Federal agencies shall
cooperate with State and local agencies to resolve water resource issues
in concert with conservation of endangered species. "14 The net effect of
present congressional responses to western concerns that state-created
water rights will be displaced is to shift the task of striking an accomodation between state and federal interests to the courts and to give water
rights holders a new but slim statutory basis to argue that a federal agency
has abused its discretion.
91. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (1982).

92. White, The Emerging Relationship Between EnvironmentalRegulations and Colorado Water Law, 53 CoLo. L. REV. 597, 618-19 1982).
93. Id. at 619.
94. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(2) (1982).
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RIVERSIDE IRRIGATION DISTRIcT: A NEW PELTON DAM?

The first major clash between the Endangered Species Act and state
water rights is now working itself through the courts. Riverside Irrigation Districtv. Andrews9" is being touted as a decision that could be as
important to western water rights as the 1955 PeltonDam decision96 that
paved the way for the recognition of federal non-Indian proprietary rights.
The real effect of Riverside, however, will be on water lawyers rather than
on water allocation patterns.
The Riverside case is not the first time in which the Endangered
Species Act has been invoked to require flow release conditions on a diversion project, but it is the first major case that has not been settled. The
first major clash between the Endangered Species Act and water allocation arose when Nebraska discovered that downstream irrigators on the
Platte River could be better protected under the wing of the endangered
whooping crane than by litigating the allocation of the river under interstate compacts and the doctrine of equitable apportionment. In that
case, Nebraska brought its "defensive end-run" suit to prevent utility companies from building the Grayrocks Dam on the North Platte River. By
seeking to enjoin the construction of the dam under the Endangered
Species Act in order to protect the endangered whooping crane, Nebraska
used federal regulatory rights to achieve its original purpose: protecting
the interests of downstream Nebraska agricultural diversions. In the end,
the focus of the litigation had permanently shifted to protect an endangered species because it was easier to get water for this purpose than
to reopen a 1945 equitable apportionment. 7
In the Grayrocks litigation, the court set aside a federal loan guarantee
from the Rural Electrification Administration (REA) and a section 404
permit because of the effect of the diversion on the downstream habitat
of the whooping crane. 98 The REA failed to consult the Fish and Wildlife
Service, and the court concluded the REA finding, that there would be
no adverse effect on the whooping crane habitat, was insufficient without
the Fish and Wildlife Service's biological assessment. The section 404 per95. 568 F. Supp. 583 (D. Colo. 1983).
96. Federal Power Comm. v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
97. In the Supreme Court's most important application of the doctrine of equitable apportionment, Nebraska was given seventy-five percent of the flow of the Platte over the objections of three Justices that the decree was premature. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S.
589 (1949). The decree did not affect the Laramie River because it had earlier been apportioned between Colorado and Wyoming. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
Nebraska's reluctance to seek additional relief under the doctrine of equitable apportionment seems wise as the Court is generally reluctant to apportion interstate waters when
future projected adverse impacts are uncertain. Nebraska and other states, resting their claims
on priority of use, may take some comfort from the Supreme Court's most recent application of the principle that priority of use is the primary factor to be considered in equitable
apportionments between two appropriation states. Colorado v. New Mexico, 104 S. Ct. 2433
(1984). In Colorado v. New Mexico, the Court placed the burden on the party initiating a
diversion to show by clear and convincing evidence that injuries to existing uses could be
mitigated and that any injuries were outweighed by the benefits of the diversion. 104 S.
Ct. at 2440.
98. Nebraska v. REA, 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1156 (D. Neb. 1978), appeal vacated
and dismissed, 594 F.2d 870 (8th Cir. 1979).
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mit was also issued before the Fish and Wildlife Service completed its
assessment, but the federal government had reserved the right to impose
operating conditions on the reservoir until the Fish and Wildlife study
was complete. The court held that to allow reservoir operation before adequate biological information was available did not adequately ensure that
the whooping crane's habitat would be preserved. A settlement favorable
to the whooping crane and, incidentally, Nebraska irrigators, ended the
litigation. 9
Riverside IrrigationDistrictv. Andrews is an important case because
it questions the federal government's authority to regulate the possible
downstream environmental impacts of water impoundment and diversion
projects under section 404 of the Clean Water Act. In Riverside, the proposed dam is located on a tributary of the South Platte River in Colorado.
Because the South Platte and the Platte Rivers are over-appropriated,
the Fish and Wildlife Service is concerned that any additional withdrawals
will jeopardize the habitat of the endangered whooping cranes."10 The Fish
and Wildlife Service's first biological assessment concluded that reservoir releases or diversions were necessary during the spring and early summer to scrub out the vegetation in the river channel. (The vegetation
enables the cranes' predators to hide and prey on them). A subsequent
assessment however suggested that any flows from Wildcat Reservoir
would not provide adequate scouring flows and that mechanical clearing
in Nebraska was necessary.
The litigation arose when the Corps of Engineers refused to issue a
nationwide permit for the discharge of sand and gravel during the construction of the dam. The Corps' decision was based on the adverse environmental impacts to the cranes' critical habitat from the operation of
the dam rather than on the impacts of the deposit of dredge and fill
material during construction. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit upheld the Corps' refusal to issue a nationwide permit, but
remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the Corps
of Engineers had exceeded its statutory authority. 10 1
On remand, the district court ruled that the Corps of Engineers had
not exceeded its authority. The opinion squarely rejected Riverside
District's contention that the federal government lacks the authority to
create water rights beyond federal-reserved proprietary water rights and
public water rights such as navigation servitude rights.102
99. See Tarlock, The Recognition of Instream Flow Rights: New Public Western Water
Rights, 25 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 24-31 (1979).
100. Projects that propose to deplete a stream rather than flood a critical habitat pose
substantial but more manageable problems under the Endangered Species Act. Depletions
pose less of a threat to species survival than flooding. For instance, the Fish and Wildlife
Service approved the Windy Gap project in Colorado after its sponsors agreed to divert 11,000
acre-feet of water annually for the protection of downstream aquatic habitat for primarily
non-endangered trout. These releases combined with habitat enhancement and research ensured that the project would not jeopardize endangered species.
101. Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Stipo, 658 F.2d 762 (10th Cir. 1981).
102. Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 568 F. Supp. 586 (D. Colo. 1983).
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Riverside District had first argued that the Corps lacked the authority to impose downstream protection conditions because of the longstanding policy of congressional deference to state water law. Riverside
District also argued that section 404 did not authorize the Corps to impose downstream protection conditions because section 404 only applies
to water-quality changes caused by the discharge of dredge and fill. In
addition, Riverside District cited section 101(g) of the Clean Water Act
to demonstrate that Congress did not intend the Act to affect state water
rights in any substantial way. 10 3 The court rejected the District's arguments in favor of the federal government's argument that deference to
state water law merely reflects congressional policy not to preempt state
law. It is not a general waiver of federal constitutional power. 0
Riverside District's second argument was that Congress lacked the
authority to create new regulatory water rights under the Clean Water
Act because, in this case, water flow release conditions would prevent Colorado from using the water allocated to it under the South Platte River
Compact.105 Riverside District's second argument is a stronger one.
Although several cases have upheld the Corps' authority to take into account a wide range of environmental impacts beyond the immediate impact of dredge and soil deposits,1 0 6 some of the Corps' section 404 nationwide permit denials have been held to be arbitrary or ultra vires. These
cases generally involved situations where the Corps lacked sufficient
authority over the entire project to justify a far-ranging inquiry or where
the project's effect on navigable waters was de minimus. 1°7 Neither one
of these situations applies to the Riverside case, however.
The real issue raised by the Riverside District's second argument is
whether the Endangered Species Act mandates protection measures at
the section 404 permitting stage. This would seem appropriate in situations where there is a substantial nexus between the project and the endangered species because all interested parties are likely to coalesce when
negotiation over mitigation measures is possible.108 Otherwise, federal objectives would be frustrated by limiting the power of the government to
prevent environmental injury to the immediate boundaries of a project.
The district court's conclusion that Congress did not intend to limit the
government's power is based on this premise:
103. Id. at 589.
104. Id. Justice Rehnquist's opinion in California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 41978),
reviving the deference doctrine, contains language that casts doubt on congressional authority
to allocate western water. Only he and Justice O'Connor, however, adhere to these extreme
and erroneous views. The deference doctrine mandates that courts find specific evidence of
congressional intent to preempt state water rights. They cannot lightly infer preemption
from highly abstract ideas of the need for federal supremacy.
105. The South Platte River Compact, 44 Stat. 195 (1926).
106. Nebraska v. REA, 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1156 (D. Neb. 1978); Winnebago Tribe
of Nebraska v. Ray, 621 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1980); Save the Bay v. United States Corps of
Engineers, 610 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1980). See also Want, FederalWetlands Law: The Cases
and the Problems, 8 HAHv. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1984).
107. Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1983); Nebraska v. REA, 12 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1156 (D. Neb. 1978).
108. See 33 U.S.C §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
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While the Endangered Species Act does not expand the scope
of federal agencies' authority, its clear language "shall insure"
directs them to exercise their authority under other statutes to
the fullest extent possible to carry out its aims. The question in
this case is therefore whether the defendant's actions here, denial
of plaintiffs' use of the nationwide permit because of potential
deleterious downstream effects, was permissible under the Clean
Water Act. If defendant's action was permissible under the Clean
Water
Act, then it was required under the Endangered Species
1 09
Act.
If Congress intended to deny the Corps of Engineers the power to use
the section 404 permit process to coordinate application of the Endangered
Species Act, section 101(g) of the Clean Water Act would seem to be the
most persuasive evidence of that intent. Although section 101(g) has not
been extensively construed by the courts, section 101(g) was a factor in
National Wildlife Federationv. Gorsuch.I1o There the court of appeals held
that the Environmental Protection Agency was reasonable in concluding
that dams were not point sources of pollution under the Clean Water Act,' I '
but the reach of this decision is problematic. The court relied on section

101(g) for the proposition "that Congress did not want to interfere any
more than necessary with state water management, of which dams are
an important component,""' 2 but the court also stated that this was not
a situation where "federal intervention is needed because the states have
abdicated their ... responsibility over a truly pressing national prob3
lem."'

109. Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 568 F. Supp. at 588. See also Winnebago
Tribe of Nebraska v. Ray, 621 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1980); Save The Bay v. Corps of Engineers,
610 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1980).
110. 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982.
111. Judge Wald, who is famous for writing opinions that list but do not conclusively
assign weight to the factors that influenced her decision, concluded that substantial deference
should be given the EPA's conclusion because neither the language of the Act nor the
legislative history yielded a conclusive answer to the question. National Widlife's strongest
argument was the uncontested evidence that dams can have an adverse effect on downstream
water quality. EPA avoided the evidence by drawing a distinction between pollution and
pollutants and the court accepted the distinction as reasonable:
The reasonableness of EPA's distinction between "pollutant" and "pollution" is reinforced by the changes made in conference. Both the Senate and
the House had used inclusive phrasing-"[t]he term 'pollutant' means, but
is not limited to, dredged spoil... and industrial, municipal, agricultural, and
other waste discharged into water." The conference committee deleted the
inclusive phrases "but is not limited to" and "other waste," albeit without
explanation.
And, while Congress did not intend the term "pollutant" to be all.
inclusive, we find, at the same time, strong signals in the legislative history
that it also entrusted EPA with at least some discretion over which
"pollutants" and sources of pollutants were to be regulated under the NPDES
program. Of course, Congress generally intended that EPA would exercise
substantial discretion in interpreting the Act.... It also specifically expected
EPA to have some power to determine both what is a "point source" and what
is a "pollutant."
Id. at 173 (citation omitted).
112. Id. at 178.
113. Id. at 183.
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The National Wildlife Federation case might be characterized as
another example of strong judicial deference to state water law, but the
deference in that case is limited compared to Justice Rehnquist's articulation of the principle in California v. United States. National Wildlife
Federationthus has limited relevance for Endangered Species Act cases.
The Riverside case underscores the nature of the relationship between
federal regulatory rights and state water rights. Here a federal agency
is willing to exercise broad jurisdiction and a contrary result might
frustrate a clear congressional objective: species preservation. The sponsors of section 101(g) realized that a federal program could interfere with
state water allocation. Section 10 1(g) is not a guarantee against all federal
interference. It is primarily a guarantee against the use of federal authority
to interfere with state water allocation programs that have no affect on
a specific federal regulatory program." 4 In Riverside, the district court
rejected Riverside District's argument that section 101(g) immunized it
against federal interference.- The court held that "while the defendant
is barring the plaintiffs from exercising their water rights in a manner
inconsistent with federal law, he [the district engineer] is not taking away
the rights. They may still be utilized, so long as in a manner consistent
with federal law.'"1"6 This conclusion seems correct because the Endangered
Species Act only prohibits state water management to the extent
necessary to effectuate the objective of protecting the whooping crane.
Riverside District's third and most intriguing argument was that conditions created by flow release would violate the South Platte Compact.
State water rights holders have no right to prevent the state from
reallocating its waters to users in other states through an interstate compact," 7 but the issue of Congress' ability to reallocate water subject to
compact has never been considered by a court. This issue has taken on
added importance after Sporhase v. Nebraska,"8 which subjects state
water rights to the negative commerce clause." 9 The issue of whether Congress has the ability to reallocate water subject to compact is not easy
to resolve, but the answer must be that Congress has the power to alter
compact allocations to achieve federal objectives."'
114. See White, supra note 92.
115. Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 568 F. Supp. 583 (D. Colo. 1983).
116. Id. at 589.
117. Hinderlider v. La Plata River and Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938), reh'g
denied, 305 U.S. 668 (1938).
118. 458 U.S. 491 (1982).
119. There is considerable speculation among western water lawyers about the relationship between Sporhase and interstate compacts based on fears that compact allocations may
not be as firm as they were once thought to be. For example, is congressional consent to
a compact an exercise of Congress' power to exempt state law from negative commerce clause
scrutiny? More explicit congressional intent is probably needed but the issue is very much
open. See New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982).
120. The classic Frankfurter and Landis work, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A
Study in InterstateAgreements, 34 YALE L.J. 685 (1925), concludes by considering congressional approval of a compact to promote regional equity:
In no wise does this solution imply a transfer by Congress of its duty towards
national affairs. On the contrary, it is a deliberate recognition by Congress that
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A compact is more than a contract among states.' 2' It is a contract
that furthers a federal interest: interstate cooperation. Thus state interests
recognized in a compact may be subject to federal policies articulated after
the compact was negotiated. The federal government has the power to
apportion interstate waters, and therefore no state rights are vested
against federal apportionment.2" Any state water rights, be they based
on state law or an interstate compact, therefore remain subject to subsequent diminution by Congress, if Congress decides to use this power.
There is some precedent for the proposition that a compact estops
3
Congress. But in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co.,'
the Supreme Court held that a compact between states could not restrict
the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. In Wheeling, Congress had retroactively authorized the construction of a bridge on the Ohio
River between Virginia and Ohio. Pennsylvania, representing the upstream
port of Pittsburgh, argued that the legislation was inconsistent with a
compact between Virginia and Kentucky that guaranteed free navigation
on the Ohio. Confronted with the question of whether a compact can limit
the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, the Court
would possess
answered: "Clearly not. Otherwise Congress and two States
2 4
the power to modify and alter the constitution itself.' 1
a particular electric power situation is predominantly the concern of the region
limited by the radius of a specific power development and outside the regulative
concern of the nation. In a zone for legislation open both to Congress and the
States, the controlling facts justify, at least for the time being, co-operative
State adjustment. Congress does not surrender any of its powers; it merely
finds no occasion for its present exercise of them. There is, therefore, no "delegation" of its power in any legally significant use of the term. But Congress does
not foreclose the future. If and when circumstances which now call for solution through compact change, Congress is wholly free to assume control. Our
constitutional history, as we have noted, records numerous instances of control by the States over phases of interstate commerce subsequently replaced
by national control because the facts of life had shifted the center of
predominance from State to national interest. The exercise of authority as between the States and Congress, in the field of interstate commerce, is necessarily
an empiric process, simply because it may invoke the exertion of legislative
power both by the States and by the Nation, and through the expedient of
compact, by a combination of the two.
Id. at 726-27.
121. Interstate compacts are based on the concept of contract, but this analogy does
not immunize them from federal power. The contract origin of compacts is important when
it is necessary to articulate standards to determine which types of interstate cooperation
can proceed without Congressional consent. Engdahl, Characterization of Interstate
Agreements: When Is A Compact Not A Compact, 64 MICH. L. REV. 63 (1965), is an ambitious attempt to formulate such standards. Following TalEPEL, VOLKERRECHT AND LANDERSaECHT (1889), Engdahl distinguishes between transactional and cooperative agreements.
The former, Vertrag, were analogized by Triepel to private contracts and the latter, Vereinbarung, to cooperative agreements by parties sharing mutual interests. Engdahl rightly
characterizes interstate water apportionment as a transactional agreement because such an
interstate agreement performs the function of treaties, the allocation of political power between sovereigns. Engdahl, supra,at 101. The exercise of federal power over compacts does
not, however, turn on this distinction.
122. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
123. 59 U.S. 421 (1856).
124. Id. at 433.
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The only remaining objections that Riverside District can make to
the Corps' permit conditions would be (1) that the Endangered Species
Act is unconstitutional or (2) that the permit conditions constitute a taking. The South Platte Compact does not estop Congress from reallocating
state water. The deference doctrine and section 101(g) of the Clean Water
Act do not restrict the Corps' actions. The argument that the Endangered
Species Act is unconstitutional is untenable. Endangered species protection is a clear exercise of Congress' commerce as well as treaty authority.
The argument that the permit conditions constitute a taking will be
difficult to maintain short of a showing that Riverside's ability to perform its intended function is virtually eliminated, which the district court
found was not the case. Western water law is designed to protect rights
holders during periods of peak demand, but conflicts such as Riverside
raise substantial, although seldom well articulated, ripeness issues that
make it hard for state water rights holders to demonstrate impairment.
The Supreme Court prefers to avoid these issues by holding that the final
effect of a regulation is not ripe for review, and courts in water cases seem
to apply this teaching. Water rights holders, claiming impairment, will
have to demonstrate that the risks of shortages during periods of peak
demand have been increased to an extent greater than have so far been
demonstrated in the cases.
THE POSSIBLE FUTURE IMPACTS OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT
AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT ON STATE WATER RIGHTS

The characterization of permit conditions as "regulatory property
rights" is a conceptual analysis: neither Congress nor the courts have
adopted it. As permit conditions are imposed, however, the issue of how
these "regulatory property rights" should be applied will arise.
The solution which best serves the needs of the federal government
and the states is to assign water rights to the project operator. The result
is that except in extraordinary cases, the project operator, as a water
rights holder, should be subject to state procedural law. The project
operator's water rights would also appear in the state record system, notifying subsequent appropriators of the federal government's claims.
State substantive doctrines may operate to frustrate federal water
rights claimed under the Endangered Species Act. When conflicts between
state law and federal objectives arise, however, state law should be
presumptively preempted. For example, some western states do not
recognize instream uses either because the use is not beneficial or because
the state does not satisfy the actual diversion requirement.'25 Neither one
of these rules should be applied to flow releases claimed under the Endangered Species Act or section 404 of the Clean Water Act. There may
be long periods of time when flow releases under the species protection
125. See C. MEYERS & A. D. TARLOCK, WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 98-116 (2d ed.
1980).
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program are not needed, but state laws that terminate water rights for
non-use should not be applied to the federal government." 6 Instead, courts
should only terminate a federal water right when the Department of the
Interior or another agency makes an affirmative determination that
releases are no longer necessary to prevent a species from jeopardy.
The issue may also arise as to whether downstream water rights holders between the point of release and the protected habitat should be able
to claim the water. Characterization of Endangered Species Act rights
as developed water is one way to resolve the problem. 7 The water would
be free of the call of the river and thus the project operator could make
releases without the risk of downstream interference. A project operator
should, however, be able to invoke the futile call doctrine under state law
if he can demonstrate that the releases would not reach the habitat area."2
Unlike section 404 of the Clean Water Act, the Endangered Species
Act should impose a duty on new and existing federal or private project
operators to supply sufficient water to protect the endangered species.
Senior water rights holders should not have to suffer uncompensated
reallocation, but project beneficiaries and other rights holders may expect to see 2 water
allocation patterns that differ from those provided under
9
state law.

Project operators will argue that there is a distinction between new
and existing projects, but this distinction is irrelevant. Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill and other cases suggest that the Act applies to existing
126. The situation in which a downstream senior appropriator is not protected are discussed in 1 W.

HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES

518-85

(1971).
127. See cases cited and discussed in Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy Dist.
v. Shelton Farms, Inc., 197 Colo. 181, 529 P.2d 1321 (1974).
128. The Act requires only those measures that are likely to prevent jeopardy to species.
Flow releases that do not protect a species or its habitat would be an abuse of the Secretary's
discretion. To date, courts have entertained arguments that non-flow augmentation strategies
exist, but have concluded that the Secretary's refusal to try them was reasonable based on
the evidence. Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1984).
129. Flow releases have long been required by the Federal Power Commission (now the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission). These releases have been sustained against
challenges that they conflict with state water rights, but the basis of the Commission's power
and limits, if any, have never been articulated. In California v. FPC, 345 F.2d 917 (9th Cir.
1984), cert denied, 382 U.S. 941 (1965), the Supreme Court declined to probe the issue because
it found that any conflict between the mandated releases and state appropriators was
hypothetical. The issue continues to be unresolved. See Wolfe, Hydropower: FERC Licensing and Emerging State-FederalWater Rights Conflicts, 29 RoCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 851,
872-75 (1984).
Federal authority to require that projects be operated in a manner that may be inconsistent with state law arises out of the case of First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop v. FPC, 328
U.S. 152 (1946), in which the Court interpreted a section of the Federal Power Act to require
deference to state water law as a mere compensation guarantee. First Iowa is wrong as a
matter of statutory construction, and the Supreme Court has held that a similar statute
in the Reclamation Act is not merely a compensation guarantee but provides a limited double veto system. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978). The decision in California
v. United States reverses a line of cases starting with First Iowa that found state law based
on the general need for federal supremacy. Clear expressions of federal policy, such as the
Endangered Species Act, will still preempt state law. See United States v. California, 694
F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1982) and Wolfe, supra, at 892-95.
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projects as well as to new ones and any other conclusion would frustrate
the purpose of the Endangered Species Act. 3 ' Retroactive compared to
prospective application, however, may not be relevant in deciding how
the Act should be applied. Perhaps countervailing considerations will be
given more weight in the exemption process when the issue is the application of the Act to an on-going project.
Carson-Truckee Water ConservancyDistrictv. Watt' illustrates the
risk to state water rights claimants under this proposal. In Carson-Truckee
the court held that the Secretary of the Interior has a duty to operate
a reservoir in Pyramid Lake, located in the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation, to protect endangered and threatened species. All parties agreed
that the Secretary had a duty to prefer fish to municipal and industrial
uses in the operation of the Stampede Reservoir in allocating water over
and above that involved in the "Orr Ditch" litigation.'32 The issue concerned to what degree fish should be preferred, and the court held that
the Secretary had a duty to defer all other uses until the fish were no longer
classified as threatened or endangered. 13 The court rejected the CarsonTruckee District's argument that the Endangered Species Act required
the Secretary to avoid only those actions that jeopardized the bare survival of the species.'3 4 As a consequence, the Carson-Truckee District's
proposed operating plan for the reservoir was found to be inconsistent
with the Secretary's species restoration duties under the Act and his
fiduciary obligation to the Tribe: "Water releases for the fishery in a single
year may require all of the Stampede storage, leaving no reserve for M&I
users in drought years."' 3 5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the trial court's analysis of the Endangered Species Act. 36 Judge Pregerson reasoned that section 3 of the Act defined the term "conserve" as
"the methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered
species or threatened species to the point at which the measures of the
Act are no longer necessary."'3 7 Thus, "the ESA supports the Secretary's
decision to give priority to the fish until such time as they no longer need
ESA's protection."" 8 The court did reverse the trial judge's construction
of the Washoe Project Act and held that the Secretary was not restricted
to water sales for municipal and industrial purposes. This construction
enabled the court to avoid the hard question: Must the Secretary use all
130. Coggins and Russell, supra note 2, at 1498-1505. Cf. Confederated Tribes and Bands
of the Yakima Indian Nation v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1984) (FERC must undertake a full study of the impact of a hydroelectric project on fishery resources prior to issuing a new license).
131. 549 F. Supp. 704 (D. Nev. 1982), affd, 741 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1984).
132. Id at 708.
133. Id at 710.
134. Id at 708.
135. Id at 711.
136. Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1984).

137. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (1982).
138. 741 F.2d at 262.
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of the project's water to protect the fish? The ultimate problem of allocating
the reservoir's supply was therefore dumped into the Secretary's
139
lap.
CONCLUSION

Like many environmental laws, the Endangered Species Act is
paradoxical. If its scientific justification is correct, we should be moving
toward institutions that practice integrated ecosystem management on
a wide geographic scale instead of concentrating our efforts on the protection of an arbitrary and limited number of species and their habitats.
But, we are not sure what integrated ecosystem management means and
we are reluctant to make major institutional changes to try and manage
our resources to this end. The Endangered Species Act will continue to
be applied to activities on a case by case basis and water project managers
and regulators will be forced to make a number of difficult decisions.
The integration into western water law of the values represented by
the Endangered Species Act and section 404 of the Clean Water Act will
not be easy. The first step is to recognize that it is legitimate for the federal
government to claim water rights under these acts. These Acts represent
a federal decision to add to the list of "beneficial" uses served by our water
resources. The issue is not whether such rights can be claimed, but under
what circumstances and in what manner they can be asserted.
Section 101(g) of the Clean Water Act and the cooperation injunction
in the Endangered Species Act reflect the principle that integration should
take place by the least intrusive means available to the federal agency.14
For instance, flow maintenance that potentially conflicts with a state
allocation pattern should be a preservation strategy of last resort. This
is the correct meaning of the oft cited but much abused principle of federal
deference to state water law. It remains proper for the courts to scrutinize
the effects of federal law on long established state-created property rights.
But, in light of its history, deference is not an excuse for the failure of
states to recognize legitimate federal interests asserted in light of changing policies in the use of our resources.'
Courts could start the process of accomodating federal and state interests by adopting a rule requiring the federal government to determine
that non-flow release protection strategies are unlikely to preserve the
species as compared to flow release strategies. This inquiry will reinforce
the federal government's duty to seek mitigation strategies that include
active management programs.
The frustration of purpose standard adopted by the Supreme Court
in United States v. New Mexico,42 setting forth when it is appropriate
to imply non-Indian reserved rights, is a possible analogy to the proposed
139. The Secretary's decisions are subject to review under an abuse of discretion standard.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 91-93.
141. 1 S. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES 166 (3d ed. 1911).
142. 438 U.S. 696 (1978(.
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rule. As applied by the Court, however, this standard leaves the federal
government with an insufficient margin of safety. The standard requires
too great a showing of specific congressional intent to protect environmental values and therefore leaves courts too little room to decide if a specific
remedy, reservoir releases for example, is an appropriate means of furthering the overall objective of the statute. An intermediate standard
would be more consistent with the purposes of the Endangered Species
Act.
The federal government should be entitled to the minimum amount
of water deemed necessary to prevent the species' habitat from a further
risk of deterioration. This determination must be based on the best
available evidence. Judicial ground rules for species protection should provide sufficient incentives for all interested parties to strike some creative
bargains rather than requiring parties to resort to the courts to solve
future protection claims.
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